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1 Introduction
In his treatise On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities (1588), the Italian
thinker Giovanni Botero described the demographic dynamics of a city as re-
sulting from the di¤erential between the citys capacity to generate new persons
(i.e. the virtus generativa) and its capacity to produce means of subsistence (i.e.
the virtus nutritiva). According to Botero, most causes of premature death at
that time (famines, crimes, diseases) were related to an insu¢ cient capacity
to produce food. Botero was also interpreting human history - its wars and
conicts - as a history of struggle for land and, hence, for means of subsistence.
Many things have changed since Botero wrote his treatise four centuries ago:
medical progress, technological progress and democratic progress. At the demo-
graphic level also, advanced economies started, in the early 19th century, what
is known as the demographic transition: survival conditions have substantially
improved, and that change was followed, few generations later, by a signicant
fall in fertility. As explained in details by Lee (2003), those changes in mortality
and fertility patterns caused a major growth in the population size, as well as a
major shift in the age structure of populations. Nowadays, fertility is more or
less stabilized in our economies, but life expectancy at birth - which has doubled
since the early 19th century - is still growing, on average, by 3 months every
year, so that the aging process is still at work.
The multiple causes of longevity improvements have been much debated
among historians. Using data on the causes of death in England and Wales,
McKeown (1976) argued that medical progress cannot fully explain longevity
gains, but that improved nutrition could be the key explanatory factor. The
role of nutrition was studied by Fogel (1994, 2004), who proposed a simple
explanation for the joint occurrence of the economic and demographic take-
o¤ in the early 19th century. Improved quantity of food must have improved
individual health and productivity, causing both the improvement of survival
conditions and further rises in the output, giving rise to a virtuous cycle.
Besides the roles of medical progress and improved nutrition, some histori-
ans, such as Easterlin (1999), highlighted that the State played a key role in the
improvement of survival conditions, since lots of market failures - externalities,
free-riding problems, coordination failures - arise in the production of health.
Easterlin argued that the large longevity gains associated to the three parts
of the epidemic transition - (1) the sanitation revolution in the 1840s; (2) the
discovery of vaccines in the 1890s; (3) the discovery of antimicrobials in the
1930s - could never have taken place if one had relied on market forces only.
The State contributed to the sanitation revolution, by providing information to
its citizens on habits that facilitate the transmission of diseases. The State also
developed infrastructures aimed at limiting the propagation of diseases (sewage,
water supply, etc.). Regarding the vaccinesrevolution, the State, by making
vaccination mandatory, prevented the occurrence of free-riding problems, as well
as problems of negligent parents.1 Finally, the State also played a crucial role
1By free-riding, we mean that the vaccination of some individuals reduce the incentives of
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in organizing the distribution of drugs to uninformed patients.
While the State played a key role in the improvement of survival conditions
in the past, it should be stressed that the lengthening of life has also raised
new challenges to the Welfare State. The challenges are twofold. On the one
hand, the aging of populations questions the sustainability of the Welfare State.
As emphasized by Lee (2003), most social insurance devices - health insurance,
pension systems, etc. - were built at a time where the average duration of life
was much lower than nowadays. Thus the increase in the life expectancy tends,
by raising the size of older age groups in the population, to question the nancial
sustainability of those devices. On the other hand, the improvement of survival
conditions is not equally shared by all individuals, in the sense that some of them
still su¤er from premature death. Given that longevity inequalities imply major
inequalities in lifetime well-being, these invite also some redistribution. But the
problem lies in the fact that social insurance systems, like pensions systems,
which were built to reduce well-being inequalities between the surviving old,
tend also to exacerbate well-being inequalities between the surviving old and
the prematurely dead. The persistence of signicant inequalities in realized
longevity constitutes thus a key challenge for the State, since these tend to
question the redistributive role of the Welfare State.
The goal of this paper is to examine the challenges raised by longevity varia-
tions for the Welfare State. Those challenges have given rise, in the last decades,
to a voluminous literature in public economics. In some sense, those demo-
graphic evolutions have forced economists to turn back and question some of
the fundamental tools used in their analyses, both at the positive level (i.e. de-
scribing what the economy is) and at the normative level (i.e. describing what
the economy should be). At the positive level, variations in human longevity
have forced economists to reconsider how the attitude of individuals towards the
risk of death was modeled, as well as how the expected life horizon inuences
individual decisions on various dimensions (savings, education, retirement). At
the normative level, variations in human longevity encouraged economists to
modify the way in which they look at inequalities, from a perspective based on
expectations (i.e. the ex ante view) to a perspective based on realizations (i.e.
the ex post view). The purpose of this paper is to review those recent advances,
and to show how these allow us to cast a new light on the challenges that ageing
raises for the Welfare State.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some key empirical
facts on the evolution of survival conditions, and on the size and persistence
of longevity inequalities. Section 3 reviews recent theoretical contributions con-
cerning how economists model survival conditions and their impact on economic
activities. Section 4 focuses on the challenges raised by unequal longevity for
normative foundations. Section 5 uses the conceptual framework introduced in
the previous sections to cast some light on the challenges faced by the Welfare
State regarding the design of optimal public policy in the context of risky and
unequal lifetimes. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 6.
others to take the vaccin.
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2 Demographic trends
Let us begin our explorations with some stylized facts on the evolution of human
longevity. For that purpose, a natural starting point consists of considering the
evolution of life expectancy at birth during the last centuries. The period life
expectancy at birth measures the average duration of life for a group of persons
born at the same point in time, and who would face, during their life, the age-
specic probabilities of death prevailing during a particular period (usually the
year under study). As shown on Figure 1, period life expectancy at birth has
strongly grown during the last three centuries. Whereas life expectancy was
equal to about 35 years in 1750 in Sweden, it is nowadays higher than 80 years.
Figure 1: Life expectancy at birth (period) in several
European countries, 1750-2013 (Sources: Human
Mortality Database)
Figure 1 shows also that the extent of growth in life expectancy has not been
constant over time: life expectancy growth has been particularly strong in the
rst part of the 20th century, but less afterwards. Another important thing that
appears on Figure 1 is the convergence between countries: whereas signicant
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inequalities existed in terms of life expectancy in the early 20th century, those
inequalities are, one century later, much smaller.
When interpreting Figure 1, it is important to keep in mind that each point
represents the expected duration of life conditionally on the survival conditions
prevailing during that year. This explains why period life expectancy data vary
strongly at the time of WWI and WWII. Another key feature of periodic data
lies in the fact that those life expectancies only predict the e¤ective average
duration of life provided age-specic probabilities of death remain constant over
time. In the light of this, it may well be the case that the large period life
expectancy levels measured in the early 21st century underestimate the average
duration of life for the people born in the early 21st century.
In order to give an idea of the potential bias, let us compare, for the 18th
and the 19th centuries, the period life expectancy at birth with the cohort
life expectancy at birth, that is, the average e¤ective duration of life among
a group of persons born at the same point in time. As shown on Figure 2 for
Sweden, the gap between the period and the cohort life expectancies at birth has
remained relatively small during the 18th century, but, after that, the cohort
life expectancy has remained permanently above the period life expectancy.
Figure 2: Period life expectancy at birth and cohort life
expectancy at birth, Sweden, 1751-1920. (Source: Human
Mortality Database)
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What is most troubling when considering Figure 2 is that the gap between,
on the one hand, the duration of life that could be expected on the basis of
observed age-specic probabilities of death, and, on the other hand, the average
realized duration of life, is growing over time. This seems to suggest that the
accuracy of period life expectancy gures as proxies for actual average durations
of life - which is perfect in periods of stationary survival conditions - should not
be overestimated. Actually, the observed trend in period life expectancy gives
us a qualitative clue regarding the future patterns of the average duration of
life, rather than an exact magnitude of the lengthening of life that will take
place in the 21st century.
Besides the use of life expectancy statistics, another way to measure the fall
of mortality consists of using survival curves. Period survival curves give us
the proportion of a cohort that reaches each age of life, conditionally on the
age-specic probabilities of death prevailing during that year. Such a focus on
the probabilities to reach the di¤erent ages of life allows us to go beyond the
mere analysis of the average duration of life, in order to consider the evolution
of the mortality risk.
As shown on Figure 3 with the example of Denmark, survival curves have
substantially moved during the last two centuries. Two distinct movements
have taken place. First, survival curves tended to shift upwards, implying that
an increasingly large proportion of the population can reach high ages of life.
This movement is known as the rectangularization of the survival curve. In the
hypothetical case of a perfectly rectangular survival curve, there would be no
risk about the duration of life, since all individuals would die at the same age.
Accordingly, in that hypothetical case, there would be no inequality in terms
of realized longevity. The second movement of the survival curve consists of
a shift to the right, implying that the duration of life lived by the long-lived
is increasing over time. This second movement can be regarded as a kind of
increase in the limit-longevity. That second movement has also been at work
in the last centuries. Note that this shift to the right is distinct from the
shift upwards, since this does not necessarily imply a reduction in longevity
risk. Although the two movements have been at work during the last two
centuries, the rectangularization has been the dominant movement during the
19th century, and during the largest part of the 20th century, whereas the rise
in the limit longevity has been dominant in the last 30 years. To see this, note
that the survival curve for year 2011 really looks like a mere translation to the
right of the 1980 survival curve.
An important thing that we learn from Figure 3 concerns the size and extent
of longevity inequalities within the population. The survival curves for 1835 and
1900 show that child mortality was a widespread phenomena at those times,
whose size has strongly decreased during the 20th century. But even if we
concentrate on the survival curves for 1950, 1980 and 2011, we see that the
proportion of Danish individuals reaching, let us say, the age of 60 years has
strongly increased, from 82 % in 1950 to 92 % in 2011. That decreasing trend
in inequality is unambiguously a good news. Note, however, that those gures
can be interpreted in a less optimistic way. Actually, what the 2011 survival
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curve tells us is that, on the basis of the survival conditions prevailing in 2011 in
Denmark, there are still 8 % of the Danish who will be dead before reaching the
age of 60 years. That proportion is far from negligible, suggesting that longevity
inequalities remain substantial nowadays.
Figure 3: Survival curves (period), total population, Denmark. (Source:
Human Mortality Database).
Thus, although longevity inequalities have been falling over time, there re-
main, nonetheless, signicant longevity di¤erentials across individuals. Longevity
di¤ers across persons because of di¤erences in lots of characteristics, such as,
among other things, gender, ethnicity, or educational background. To illustrate
this, let us rst look at the evolution of life expectancy at birth for males and
females in Sweden. As shown on Figure 4, women have exhibited, over the three
centuries considered, a higher life expectancy than men. Although the gender
gap has decreased during he last 30 years (it was equal to 6 years in 1980), it
remains substantial nowadays, and is equal to 4 years in 2011.
Besides gender, another important characteristics that is correlated with
longevity inequalities is ethnicity. This point was strongly highlighted by Sen
(1998), who argued that the life expectancy of black males in some poor U.S.
neighborhoods was in some cases lower than the life expectancy prevailing in
some developing countries.
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Figure 4: Life expectancy at birth (period)
for females and males, Sweden (1751-2012).
(Source: Human Mortality Database).
To illustrate this, Figure 5 compares, for the United States, life expectancy
at birth and life expectancy at age 65 among black and white females and
among black and white males. Obviously, life expectancy at birth is higher
for the white, and the black/white gap is equal to 3,5 years for women and
to 5,3 years for men. This gap is substantial, and is much larger than the
male/female di¤erential in life expectancy (equal to 4.8 years). Thus inequalities
in life expectancy associated to ethnicity are sizeable. When considering life
expectancy at age 65, it appears that longevity di¤erentials remain across ethnic
groups, although their sizes are smaller in absolute terms. Black femaless life
expectancy at age 65 remains one year smaller than the one of white females,
whereas for males the gap is equal to about 2 years.
Another important source of longevity inequalities lies in the educational
background. As shown on Figure 6 on the basis of U.S. data, the life expectancy
at age 25 was, in 2006, 9,3 years smaller for men with low educational back-
ground than for men with a bachelor degree. For females, the education gap
is a bit smaller, but still substantial: the life expectancy at age 25 of low edu-
cated women is 8,6 years shorter than the one of highly educated women. Those
longevity inequalities due to education are not only substantial: education-based
inequalities in longevity are also growing over time, as shown by the gures ob-
tained from similar calculations for year 1996. While life expectancy at age 25
has increased by 2 years for highly educated men between 1996 and 2006, the
life expectancy at age 25 for low educated males has remained almost stable.
Regarding women, the picture is even worse, since life expectancy at age 25 has,
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for the low educated women, decreased between 1996 and 2006, leading to an
even larger educational gap.
Figure 5: Life expectancy at birth and at age 65 by
ethnic groups, United States, 2009. (Source: Arias
2014).
Figure 6: Life expectancy at age 25 by education
level, males and females, United States, 1996 and
2006. (Source: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2014).
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In sum, those few gures su¢ ce to illustrate that, despite a substantial im-
provement of survival conditions on average, there remain signicant inequalities
in longevity achievements within the population. Those two demographic ten-
dencies raise deep challenges to policy-makers: how can the Welfare State adapt
to the increase in average longevity, while providing more redistribution towards
the unlucky short-lived? Before considering that policy issue, the next section
introduces some theoretical material.
3 Some theoretical issues
In order to examine the challenges raised by longevity variations, it is rst neces-
sary to consider how the variation of survival conditions is taken into account in
the standard economic model of the life cycle, which is used as a benchmark for
studying decisions such as savings, retirement, education and prevention.2 For
that purpose, we will rst discuss how the representation of individual prefer-
ences reects their attitude towards mortality risks. Then, we will focus on the
existence of horizon e¤ects in economic decisions. Furthermore, we will consider
the endogeneity of survival conditions.
3.1 Attitude towards mortality risk
In the standard life cycle model, individual preferences over consumption proles
are represented by a weighted sum of temporal utility functions, where the
weights represent individual time preferences. In a two-period case (young age,
old age), this yields the following representation:
U (c; d) = u(c) + `u(d) (1)
where c denotes rst-period and d denotes second-period consumption, while 
is a time preference parameter (0    1). The temporal utility function is
usually supposed to be increasing and concave in consumption. The parameter
` reects the duration of the old age (0 < `  1).
Let us now introduce some risk regarding the duration of life, and suppose
that the probability of survival to the old age is equal to 0 <   1. Life
expectancy at birth is equal to  (1 + `) + (1  ) 1 = 1 + `. Once the risk
about the duration of life is introduced, preferences are now dened on lotteries
of life, specifying a particular duration of life and its probability of occurrence.
If one adopts the standard expected utility hypothesis, preferences on lotteries
of life can be represented as follows:
EU (c; d) =  [u(c) + `u(d)] + (1  )u(c)
= u(c) + `u(d) (2)
2 In the following section, we focus on the standard life cycle model, and do not consider
philosophical issues raised by the representation of what can be called "lifetime well-being".
On this, see Ponthiere (2015).
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where the temporal utility associated to death is normalized to 0. Note that, in
this representation, the survival probability  plays a similar role to the one of
the pure discount factor . This explains why  is often regarded as a natural
or biological discount factor.
As stressed by Bommier (2006, 2007, 2010), an interesting feature of this
representation of individual preferences lies in the implicit postulate of net risk
neutrality with respect to the duration of life. Net risk neutrality with respect
to the duration of life is dened as follows. An individual exhibits net risk
neutrality with respect to the duration of his life if, provided there is no pure
time preference ( = 1) and provided consumption proles are at (c = d),
he is strictly indi¤erent between lotteries of life that yield the same expected
duration of life, independently on how risky those lotteries are.
In a two-period case, net risk neutrality about the duration of life implies,
for instance, the strict indi¤erence between the following two lotteries: lottery
1, where c = d = c^,  = 1 and ` = 1=2, and lottery 2, where c = d = c^,  = 1=2
and ` = 1. Those two lotteries exhibit the same life expectancy, but di¤er quite
strongly: whereas lottery 1 is degenerate, and guarantees a life of duration 1:5
for sure, lottery 2 is far more risky, and involves two equally likely scenarios,
where the duration of life equals 1 and 2 respectively.
The standard representation of individual preferences over lotteries of life
shown above leads to the same kind of indi¤erence. However, as Bommier
pointed out, this kind of indi¤erence is unlikely in real life. Hence, Bommier
proposed to modify the standard model of the life cycle, by relaxing the assump-
tion of additive lifetime welfare. When lifetime well-being becomes a concave
transform of the sum of temporal welfare:
U (c; d) =  [u(c) + `u(d)] (3)
with 0 () > 0 and 00 () < 0, the expected lifetime well-being becomes:
EU (c; d) =  [u(c) + `u(d)] + (1  ) [u(c)] (4)
When preferences are represented by that function, individuals are no longer
risk neutral with respect to the duration of their life. It is easy to see that they
are risk-averse due to the concavity of  (). To illustrate this, let us turn
back to our example. The expected lifetime well-being of lottery 1 is equal to
 [(1:5)u(c^)], whereas the one of lottery 2 is equal to (1=2) [2u(c^)]+(1=2) [u(c^)].
Given the concavity of  (), the expected lifetime well-being associated to lot-
tery 1 now exceeds the one of lottery 2, implying that net risk neutrality with
respect to the duration of life does not hold any longer.
Bommiers critique of the life cycle model raises an important challenge. In-
deed, economists consider since at least Bernoulli (1730) that risk aversion with
respect to money is an important feature of human behavior, which deserves to
be taken into account in their analyses. However, before Bommiers work, there
was little emphasis on individuals attitude towards a major risk in life: the risk
of death. But at the same time, Bommiers formulation raises the complexity
of the study of the life cycle, which is a new challenge for economists.3
3Note that relaxing the assumption of time-additive welfare is not the only way to introduce
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3.2 Horizon e¤ects
Having discussed how the attitude towards risk with respect to the duration of
life a¤ects the representation of individual preferences on lotteries of life, let us
now consider some implications of this for economic decisions.
A rst natural decision to be considered is the savings decision, which has
been studied in details by economists since Yaari (1965).4 Actually, it is quite
intuitive to expect that, as survival conditions improve, individuals would ratio-
nally choose to save more. However, things may not be as simple as expected at
rst glance. In order to examine the impact of survival conditions on savings,
let us assume that there exists a perfect annuity market with actuarially fair
return, so that the interest factor for savings is equal to ~R = R . Let us assume
also that the individual works during the entire young age and receives a wage
w, and that he retires at the beginning of the old age. The savings problem can
be written as:
max
s


u(w   s) + `u(Rs
`
)

+ (1  ) [u(w   s)]
The rst-order condition for optimal savings is:
0

u(w   s) + `u

Rs
`

 u0 (w   s) + u0

Rs
`

R


= (1  )0 [u(w   s)]u0 (w   s) (5)
Obviously, if individuals are risk-neutral with respect to the duration of life,
we have 0 () equal to a constant . Hence the condition becomes:
u0 (w   s) = Ru0

Rs
`

(6)
From that expression, it appears that a rise in  and a rise in ` have a
symmetric e¤ect on the optimal savings, and tend both to raise the optimal
amount of savings ceteris paribus. Indeed, when either  or ` increases, this
reduces the level of old age consumption for a given amount of savings, which
raises the marginal utility of old-age consumption, inviting a rise in savings.
Under risk-neutrality with respect to the duration of life, the source of the
increase in life expectancy - i.e.  or ` - does not matter; only the fact that life
expectancy grows matters.
However, those two sources of life expectancy gains are no longer equivalent
once risk-aversion with respect to the length of life is introduced. To see this,
note rst that a rise in the duration of the old age ` does not a¤ect the RHS of the
FOC, but this reduces the rst factor of the LHS (assuming u
 
Rs
`
 Rs` u0  Rs`  >
0) and raises the second factor of the LHS. The impact of a rise in the duration of
risk aversion with respect to the length of life. Another road consists of relaxing the expected
utility hypothesis. On this, see Leroux and Ponthiere (2009).
4On recent extensions of Yaaris study, see DAlbis and Thibault (2010, 2012), who consider
the decisions to save and to annuitize under various kinds of preferences.
12
the old age on savings is thus ambiguous, unlike in the baseline model. Similarly,
the e¤ect of a rise in  is more complex. A rise in  raises the rst factor of
the LHS, but has ambiguous on the second factor of the RHS, and reduces the
LHS. Thus the impact of a rise in  is also ambiguous.
To assess the implications of risk-aversion with respect to the duration of
life on optimal savings, let us rewrite the FOC as:
u0 (w   s) = R

u0

Rs
`

  (1  )
0 [u(w   s)]u0 (w   s)
0

u(w   s) + `u  Rs`  (7)
Obviously, when  = 1, we have u0 (w   s) = Ru0  Rs` , and the optimal
savings is the same as under risk-neutrality. However, once  < 1, the LHS of
this condition remains the same as in the benchmark case, but the rst term
of the RHS is now raised, pushing towards more savings in comparison to the
baseline case, whereas the second term is negative, pushing towards less savings.
If  () is strongly concave, we have 0 [u(w   s)] >> 0 u(w   s) + `u  Rs` ,
which would push towards less savings. Thus the introduction of risk-aversion
may lead, in theory, to either larger or smaller savings, the latter case being
more plausible when individuals are strongly risk-averse.
Regarding the impact of the lifetime horizon `, note that a rise in ` raises
the rst term of the RHS, leading to more savings, as in the benchmark case,
but, provided u
 
Rs
`
  Rs` u0  Rs`  > 0, this tends also to raise the absolute value
of the second term, which is negative, and which pushes towards less savings.
Hence, in comparison to the risk-neutrality case, a rise in ` does no longer have
the same - unambiguous - impact on savings. It may be the case that a rise in
` reduces the amount saved, unlike under risk neutrality.
Let us further illustrate the impact of introducing risk-aversion with respect
to the duration of life by considering education choices. In a seminal contri-
bution, Ben-Porath (1967) argued that the life horizon faced by individuals
tends, by raising the welfare gains from educational investments, to push to-
wards larger investments in education. This so-called "Ben Porath e¤ect" has
become, in the recent years, a major mechanism present in models of long-run
economic dynamics (see de la Croix and Licandro 2013).
In order to show how risk aversion can a¤ect education choices, let us con-
sider a simple framework where individuals, who can work in the two periods,
decide to spend a fraction e of the young age for education (0 < e < 1), and
receive, in the second period, a return on education under the form of a wage
premium h(e) (with h0(e) > 0, h00(e) < 0). Assuming no savings, the individ-
uals problem can be written as:
max
e


u(w(1  e)) + `u

h(e)w
`

+ (1  ) [u(w(1  e))]
The rst-order condition for optimal education is:
0

u(w(1  e)) + `u

h(e)w
`

 wu0(w(1  e)) + u0

h(e)w
`

h0(e)w

= (1  )0 [u(w(1  e))]wu0(w(1  e)) (8)
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Under risk-neutrality with respect to the duration of life, this condition
would become:
u0(w(1  e)) = u0

h(e)w
`

h0(e) (9)
That condition equalizes, at the margin, the welfare loss due to education
(LHS) and the welfare gain from education (RHS). Obviously, a rise in  raises
the marginal welfare gain from education, leading to a rise in e. Similarly, a
rise in ` raises the marginal welfare gain from education, pushing towards more
education. Thus, under risk-neutrality with respect to the length of life, an
improvement of survival conditions does necessarily imply more education.
Once risk-aversion with respect to the duration of life is introduced, the
condition for optimal education can be written as:
u0(w(1  e)) = u0

h(e)w
`

h0(e)  (1  )
0 [u(w(1  e))]u0(w(1  e))
0
h
u(w(1  e)) + `u

h(e)w
`
i (10)
Obviously, under certain lifetime (i.e.  = 1), this condition would be the
same as under risk-neutrality, leading to the same level of education. However,
under  < 1, the LHS remains the same, but the rst term of the RHS is
now divided by , which pushes towards more education, while the additional
second term of the RHS is unambiguously negative, and pushing towards less
education. Regarding the impact of the lifetime horizon `, note that a rise in `
raises the rst term of the RHS, leading to more education, as in the benchmark
case, but, provided u

h(e)w
`

  h(e)w` u0

h(e)w
`

> 0, this tends also to raise the
absolute value of the second term, which is negative, and which pushes towards
less education. Hence, in comparison to the risk-neutrality case, a rise in `
does no longer have the same - unambiguous - impact on education. It may be
the case that a rise in ` reduces the educational investment, unlike under risk
neutrality.
Finally, let us conclude our study of horizon e¤ects by focusing on the retire-
ment decision. For that purpose, let us suppose that individuals can decide the
fraction z of the old age that they work (0 < z < `). They face some desutility
of old age labor v(z), which is increasing and convex. The choice of savings and
retirement can be written as:
max
s;z


u(w   s) + `u(zw
`
+
Rs
`
)  v(z)

+ (1  ) [u(w   s)]
The rst-order condition for optimal savings is now:
0

u(w   s) + `u

zw
`
+
Rs
`

  v(z)
 
 u0 (w   s) + u0

zw
`
+
Rs
`

R


= (1  )0 [u(w   s)]u0 (w   s) (11)
The rst-order condition for optimal retirement is:
0

u(w   s) + `u

zw
`
+
Rs
`

  v(z)
 
u0

zw
`
+
Rs
`

w   v0(z)

= 0
(12)
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The condition for optimal retirement can hold only if
u0

zw
`
+
Rs
`

w = v0(z) (13)
that is, provided the marginal utility of further work at the old age is equal to
the marginal utility loss from further old-age work. Note that this condition
characterizes the optimal retirement age whatever the individual is risk-neutral
or risk-averse with respect to the duration of his life. However, although the
condition is formally similar in both cases, the level of the optimal retirement age
will di¤er depending on the degree of risk, since this a¤ects, as we showed, the
amount of savings, which will inuence the marginal welfare gain from further
old age labor. Clearly, if the individual is more risk averse with respect to the
duration of his life, he is likely, as we showed, to save less, which will push
towards more labour at the old age, and, hence, towards the postponement of
retirement.
3.3 Endogenous mortality risks
Up to now, we considered an economy where survival conditions are exogenous
to individuals. This constitutes a signicant simplication, since humans do,
through their behavior, a¤ect their survival chances. Actually, whereas exoge-
nous factors, such as the genetic background, account for a signicant part of
longevity inequalities (about 30 % according to Christensen et al 2006), human
behaviors, such as eating behavior, drinking behavior, physical activity, smoking
and sleep patterns, are responsible for about 25 % of longevity inequalities (see
Cotoyannis and Jones, 2004, Balia and Jones, 2008). Among those behavioral
factors, one can distinguish between inputs that contribute positively to health
production (i.e. prevention, such as physical activity or diet) and inputs that
contribute negatively (i.e. sin goods, such as tobacco, alcohol and fat food).
In order to illustrate the impact of risk-aversion with respect to the duration
of life on preventive behavior, let us consider the problem faced by an individual,
who can invest an amount H at the young age, which reduces his consumption
and well-being at that age, but increases the probability of reaching the old age,
which is now a function  (H) that is increasing and concave. In the following,
we suppose that there exists a perfect annuity market, and that individuals take
into account the impact of prevention on the returns from savings.5
Assuming that all individuals retire at the end of the young age, the problem
of the choice for optimal prevention can be written as:
max
s;H
 (H)

u(w   s H) + `u( Rs
 (H) `
)

+ (1   (H)) [u(w   s H)]
5That issue is further discussed in the next section.
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The rst-order condition for optimal savings is:
 (H)0

u(w   s H) + `u

Rs
 (H) `

 u0 (w   s H) + u0

Rs
 (H) `

R
 (H)

= (1   (H))0 [u(w   s H)]u0 (w   s H) (14)
The rst-order condition for optimal prevention is:
0 (H)

u(w   s H) + `u( Rs
 (H) `
)

+ (H)0

u(w   s H) + `u

Rs
 (H) `
"
 u0 (w   s H)  u0

Rs
 (H) `

Rs0 (H)
[ (H)]
2
#
= 0 (H)) [u(w   s H)] + (1   (H))0 [u(w   s H)]u0 (w   s H) (15)
Under risk-neutrality, the condition for optimal prevention can be reduced
to:
0 (H)



u(w   s H) + `u( Rs
 (H) `
)

   [u(w   s H)]

= u0 (w   s H) + u0

Rs
 (H) `

Rs0 (H)
 (H)
(16)
which can be rewritten as:
0 (H)

`u

Rs
 (H) `

  u0

Rs
 (H) `

Rs
 (H)

= u0 (w   s H) (17)
The rst term in brackets captures the pure welfare gain from increasing the
survival probability, for a given level of old-age consumption, whereas the second
term in brackets captures the welfare loss due to old-age consumption reduction
when survival conditions improve. In general, the rst term dominates the
second one. Given that, from the FOC for savings, we have:
u0 (w   s H) = Ru0

Rs
 (H) `

(18)
The condition for optimal H can be written as:
0 (H) `u

Rs
 (H) `

= u0

Rs
 (H) `

R

1 +
0 (H) s
 (H)

(19)
A rise in ` raises, in general, the LHS of that condition. But it also raises the
RHS, so that it is di¢ cult to draw a general conclusion regarding the impact of
` on optimal prevention. The reason is that an increase in the duration of the
old age tends, at the same time, to make survival to the old age more worthy,
but, also, pushes some additional pressure on available resources, which pushes
towards spending less on prevention. Whether prevention increases or not when
` increases depends on which e¤ect dominates the other.
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Note that things are even more complex when the individual exhibit risk
aversion with respect to the duration of life. Substituting for the FOC for
optimal savings in the FOC for prevention then yields:
0 (H)



u(w   s H) + `u( Rs
 (H) `
)

   [u(w   s H)]

= 0

u(w   s H) + `u

Rs
 (H) `

u0

Rs
 (H) `

R

1 +
0 (H) s
 (H)

(20)
The LHS of that expression reects the pure marginal welfare gain from
increasing the survival chance to the old age, ceteris paribus. Note that, the more
concave  () is, the lower the LHS will be, since, in that case, the gains, in terms
of lifetime well-being, from having an old age are more limited. Thus a higher
degree of risk aversion reduces the support for investing in prevention. The RHS
captures the marginal welfare loss from increasing prevention. The RHS is close
to the one under risk neutrality, except that u0

Rs
(H)`

R

1 + 
0(H)s
(H)

is now
multiplied by 0
h
u(w   s H) + `u

Rs
(H)`
i
.
Regarding the impact of a rise in the life horizon `, things are more complex
than in the benchmark case. But it is likely that the impact of a variation in `
on the LHS will be smaller than under risk neutrality, whereas a rise in ` is likely
to reduce also the rst factor of the RHS. The e¤ect is thus quite ambiguous.
It is quite di¢ cult, in analytical terms, to see whether a rise in the life horizon
` leads to an increase or to a decrease in the amount of prevention. Obviously,
more precise assumptions on the functions  (), u () and  () are required in
order to be able to draw more accurate conclusions regarding the existence of
horizon e¤ects for prevention decisions.
4 Normative foundations
Whereas we focused so far on positive issues - mainly the impact of changes
in the life horizon on various economic decisions -, it is also worth examining
variations in survival conditions from a normative perspective. Since our goal is
to examine challenges raised by varying survival conditions for policy-makers,
it makes sense to consider the selection of a particular social welfare function
that will serve as an objective for the derivation of optimal policies.
For that purpose, we are going to compare, in this section, two particular
normative approaches: on the one hand, the utilitarian social objective; on the
other hand, the ex post egalitarian social objective.
4.1 Utilitarianism and unequal longevity
A rst, standard approach consists of taking as a social objective the sum of
all individualslifetime well-being levels. That classical utilitarian approach is
in line with Benthams (1789) Principle of Utility. In the present context, we
have focused on a population that is composed of individuals who are identical
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ex ante, but who di¤er only regarding the duration of their life realized ex
post. Hence, if we consider a simple allocation problem where an amount W
of resources is to be divided among the population, the problem of the social
planner can be written as:6
max
c;d
 [ [u(c) + `u(d)]] + (1  ) [u(c)]
s.t. c+ `d = W
The rst-order conditions of that problem are:
0 [u(c) + `u(d)]u0(c) + (1  )0 [u(c)]u0(c) =  (21)
0 [u(c) + `u(d)]u0(d) =  (22)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
Note that, if individuals are risk-neutral with respect to the duration of life,
those FOCs can be simplied to:
u0(c) = u0(d) =  =) c = d = W
1 + `
(23)
Hence, when the population is composed of risk-neutral individuals with
respect to the duration of their life, the utilitarian social planner recommends
an equalization of consumption across individuals and across periods. Note that
this perfect smoothing of consumption along the life cycle would also be chosen
by a single risk-neutral individual choosing his savings in such as way as to
maximize his expected lifetime well-being while facing a risk 1    of dying
prematurely.
However, when considering the general case individuals are risk-averse with
respect to the duration of their life, such a perfect smoothing does not take
place. Actually, combining the two FOCs yields:
u0(d)
u0(c)
=
0 [u(c) + `u(d)] + (1  )0 [u(c)]
0 [u(c) + `u(d)]
=  + (1  ) 
0 [u(c)]
0 [u(c) + `u(d)]
(24)
From that condition, it is clear that, under a linear  (), the RHS would
equal 1, and consumption would be smoothed along the life cycle. However, it
is no longer true under risk aversion with respect to the duration of life. When
 () is strongly concave, the factor 0[u(c)]0[u(c)+`u(d)] is then larger than 1, leading
to decreasing consumption along the life cycle: c > d. Thus, from a social
perspective, the degree of individual risk aversion with respect to the duration
of life is crucial, since this determines the slope of optimal consumption proles
from a utilitarian perspective.
6We abstract here from pure time preferences.
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An important thing to notice concern the impact of the life horizon ` on the
shape of the optimal consumption prole. Under risk neutrality with respect
to the duration of life, the duration ` only a¤ects the level of the consumption
prole, but not its slope. In that case, the larger ` is, the lower the consumption
prole is. However, under risk-averse individuals with respect to the length of
life, the level of ` a¤ects also the slope of the optimal consumption prole. The
higher ` is, the larger is the second term in the above condition, yielding a lower
level of consumption during the old age in comparison with the young age. Thus
a longer life horizon leads to a more decreasing optimal consumption prole.
Note, however, that the utilitarian solution of that social planning problem
can be questioned on some ethical grounds. Actually, although all individuals
are equal ex ante (i.e. before the duration of life is revealed for each individual),
those individuals di¤er strongly ex post (i.e. after the duration of life is revealed
for each individual). In welfare terms, short-lived people are, in general worst-o¤
than long-lived persons. To see this, it su¢ ces to compare the realized lifetime
well-being of short-lived and long-lived persons:
 (u(c)) ?  [u(c) + `u(d)]
Obviously, short-lived persons are worst-o¤ than long-lived persons when u(d) >
0. That condition is most likely to be veried under risk neutrality (that con-
dition amounts then to u

W
1+`

> 0). It is also likely to be veried - but to a
lower extent - under risk aversion with respect to the duration of life, as shown
in Leroux and Ponthiere (2013).
But the prevalence of well-being inequalities across individuals at the social
optimum is not, in the present context, the worst corollary of the utilitarian
social welfare function. Actually, it can be shown that, in many cases, utilitari-
anism tends to lead to well-being inequalities between short-lived and long-lived
individuals that exceed the ones that would have prevailed at the laissez-faire.
Put it di¤erently, utilitarianism then leads to a kind of double penalty for the
short-lived. These are penalized once by Nature (since well-being opportunities
are reduced for the short-lived) and once by Bentham (since utilitarianism in-
duces redistribution from the short-lived to the long-lived). Thus, under mild
conditions, utilitarianism tends to reinforce rather than reduce inequalities in
lifetime well-being between individuals. That point has been studied in detail
in Leroux and Ponthiere (2013).
To see this, let us illustrate the simplest case, without risk (i.e.  = 1).7
Let us suppose that there are two individuals, one is short lived and dies after
the young age (i.e. ` = 0), whereas the other one is long lived and enjoys the
old age (i.e. ` = 1). At the laissez-faire, the rst individual will consume his
entire endowment w before dying (i.e. c1 = w). On the contrary, the second
individual will consume w=2 at each period of his life (i.e. c2 = d2 = w=2).
Let us now compare this allocation with the utilitarian optimum. The util-
7We also suppose that the transform  () is here linear.
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itarian social planner will solve the problem:
max
c1;c2;d2
u(c1) + u(c2) + u(d2)
s.t. c1 + c2 + d2 = 2w
which leads, as a solution:
c1 =
2w
3
< w (25)
c2 = d2 =
2w
3
>
w
2
(26)
In the light of this, it appears clearly that the short-lived individual consumes,
at the utilitarian optimum, less than what he consumed at the laissez-faire. On
the contrary, long-lived individuals benet, at the utilitarian optimum, of more
resources in comparison with the laissez-faire.
This example shows that utilitarianism can, in some cases, exacerbate well-
being inequalities between the short-lived and the long-lived, by redistributing
resources from the former to the latter, against any ethical intuition. Put it
di¤erently, utilitarianism tends to make things even worse than at the laissez-
faire for the unlucky short-lived. Obviously, introducing some risk-aversion with
respect to the duration of life could a¤ect this conclusion, by reducing the extent
of redistribution from the short-lived to the long-lived. However, under mild
degrees of risk aversion, this counterintuitive corollary of utilitarianism is likely
to remain.8
4.2 Ex post egalitarianism
This treatment of longevity inequalities under utilitarianism is hardly defend-
able, since individuals are here not responsible at all for inequalities in realized
durations of life. Hence, if one follows Fleurbaeys theory of fairness (Fleurbaey
2008), those inequalities should be abolished by governments, since the victims
of those inequalities can hardly be regarded as responsible for these. Therefore,
it makes sense to consider an alternative, social objective, which amounts to
maximize the realized lifetime well-being of the short-lived persons.
Actually, Fleurbaey et al (2014) show that, once that social objective is
adopted, it is possible for the social planner to abolish inequalities in realized
lifetime well-being across short-lived and long-lived individuals, provided the
available aggregate resources are su¢ ciently large so as to insure u(c) > 0 at all
periods for all individuals.
Under that alternative social objective, the problem becomes:
max
c;d
min f [u(c)] ;  [u(c) + `u(d)]g
s.t. c+ `d = W
8On this, see Leroux and Ponthiere (2013).
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The objective function is not di¤erentiable, but this problem can be rewritten
as the maximization of the well-being of the short-lived subject to the constraint
that the long-lived is not worst-o¤ than the short-lived:
max
c;d
 [u(c)]
s.t. c+ `d = W
s.t.  [u(c) + `u(d)]   [u(c)]
When the egalitarian constraint is biding, we have u(d) = 0, implying that
old-age consumption is xed to the neutral level for continuing existence, i.e. to
the level c such that u(c) = 0.9 Then we have:
c = W   `c (27)
d = c (28)
Under that allocation, consumption proles are strongly decreasing. This
solution may look counter-intuitive, but this is the price to pay to minimize
inequalities in realized lifetime well-being across short-lived and long-lived in-
dividuals. Concentrating the consumption of resources early in life (when all
individuals are still alive) allows to provide higher well-being levels at the young
age for all individuals. More importantly, this will maximize the realized lifetime
well-being of the unlucky short-lived.
Regarding the impact of the life horizon `, it follows from the above analysis
that the larger ` is, the less decreasing the optimal consumption prole will be.
Thus, in comparison with the utilitarian social optimum, the parameter ` has
here an opposite e¤ect on the slope of the socially optimal consumption prole.
If we turn back to the previous two-person example with risk-neutrality with
respect to the duration of life, the problem of the social planner is here:10
max
c1;c2;d2
min fu(c1); u(c2) + u(d2)g
s.t. c1 + c2 + d2 = 2w
The solution to that problem is:
c1 = c2 =
2w   c
2
(29)
d2 = c (30)
Note that, at this allocation, there exists no inequality in lifetime well-being
between the short-lived and the long-lived, since we have:
u

2w   c
2

= u

2w   c
2

+ u(c) (31)
9The consumption level c is such that it brings a utility level that is regarded as neutral
for the continuation of existence (see Broome 2004).
10We suppose here that the social planner knows that one person will be short-lived, but
cannot identify that person ex ante.
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since u(c) = 0. Thus, contrary to what utilitarianism does, the ex post egali-
tarian optimum does not exacerbate well-being inequalities between short-lived
and long-lived agents, but make these inequalities disappear.
This section shows that adopting a standard utilitarian social welfare func-
tion or, alternatively, the ex post egalitarian social welfare function, has signif-
icant consequences regarding the form of the social optimum. Note, however,
that our discussion has concentrated mainly on a highly abstract resource al-
location problem. The next section will explore policy issues that are closer to
the ones faced by contemporary policy-makers.
5 Policy issues
Having examined some conceptual issues, we can now focus on the policy chal-
lenges raised by varying longevity. Actually, shifting from an economy with xed
longevity to a more realistic economy with varying - and potentially unequal -
longevity raises additional di¢ culties for the design of optimal public policy. As
we will see, varying longevity tends to signicantly complicate policy analysis
in elds as diverse as labour market regulations, health policy, education policy,
pensions and the taxation of wealth and bequests.
5.1 Harsher occupation and shorter life
Social security systems are under increased scal pressure due to the impact
of population ageing. With increasing life expectancies it seems reasonable
to require individuals to work longer. In recent years, several countries have
increased the legal age of retirement and other countries are considering doing
so. However, the chances of reaching and living retirement in good health di¤er
signicantly among individuals. It has been shown that the chances of living
longer and in good health are closely correlated with occupation (see van Raalte
2012). One can thus raise the question of allowing the pension policies, and in
particular the retirement age, to di¤er by occupation.
Pestieau and Racionero (2015) argue against favorable treatments in terms
of retirement age and pension benets for all the workers involved in hazardous
jobs, such as underground mining, because on average this type of work in-
creases mortality and reduces life expectancy, thus shortening the time during
which retirement benets can be enjoyed. Such policy could be defended if
the correlation between longevity and occupation were perfect. Unfortunately,
things are not as clear-cut. Even in hazardous jobs some workers end up having
a long and healthy life and in safe jobs some workers endanger their health and
face reduced longevity. Furthermore because of asymmetric information policy
administrators are unable to observe individual health conditions without going
through costly and imperfect tests.
In their paper, Pestieau and Racionero (2015) discuss the design of spe-
cial pension schemes in an asymmetric information framework. Individuals are
characterized by their longevity and occupation. They are better informed
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about their longevity prospects than the government. There is however some
(imperfect) correlation between longevity and occupation, and occupation is
observable.
To make the presentation simple, they adopt a two period model in which
there are only two occupations and two longevity types. The occupational
equilibrium implies that the wage is higher in the harsh occupation. Workers
employed in a harsh occupation face a higher probability of a short life than
those in a safe occupation. Longevity is private information and is learned by
the worker sometime in the rst period. The lifecycle utility of an agent with
occupation i and longevity j takes the following form:
u(cij) + `ju(dij)  v (zij ; `j) (32)
where the disutility of old age labor v (zij ; `j) is assumed to be inversely related
to longevity. In other words, a worker who expects to live longer has a lower
disutility from delaying retirement than one with a shorter life expectancy.
Pestieau and Racionero (2015) employ an optimal non-linear taxation ap-
proach: i.e. they identify the optimal bundle of consumption in both periods
and of retirement age for each type of individual, and show how the optimal
solution can be implemented with a social security scheme. They show that
short-lived workers face marginal distortions on savings and prolonging activity.
They are induced to consume relatively more when young than when old. This
result is in the same vein as that of Fleurbaey et al. (2014) who argue that
if one takes an ex post viewpoint some priority should be given to rst-period
consumption.
The denition of the socially optimal retirement age is also examined in
Fleurbaey et al (2015) in a framework where individuals di¤er in life expectancy
and in realized longevity. Given that di¤erent occupations lead to unequal
life expectancies, that framework is also relevant for the issue at stake here.
Fleurbaey et al (2015) insist on the fact that whether the retirement age should
be di¤erentiated or not according to the occupation depends on whether one
adopts an ex ante or an ex post egalitarian view. From an ex ante perspective,
it is justied to give priority to individuals having a lower life expectancy, and
thus being in a harsher occupation. Hence, from that perspective, individuals
with harsher occupations should be allowed to retire earlier. On the contrary,
from the perspective of maximizing the ex post lifetime well-being of the worst-
o¤ - who is, in general, a victim of premature death -, there is some argument for
postponing retirement for all individuals, whatever their occupation is, in such
a way as to transfer more resources towards the young (to compensate him for
his shorter life). In that case di¤erences in life expectancies become irrelevant.
5.2 Preventive and curative health care
As already alluded, rationality or farsightedness can contribute to a longer life
and a better health. The possibility to invest in ones future health raises
some important challenges from a policy perspective. A well-known challenge
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consists of the choice of an optimal balance between preventive and curative
health expenditures. Should the State spend more on prevention and less on
curative expenditures, or the opposite? That question is complex, and the
answer depends on the underlying assumption on individual rationality.
The preventive versus curative dilemma was studied by Cremer et al (2012)
in an economy where individuals live for two periods: the rst one is of length
one and the second has a length that depends on private investment in health
and on some sinful consumption in the rst period (i.e. alcohol, cigarettes, junk
food, etc.). The lifetime welfare of individuals takes here the following form:
u (c) + ' (x) + ` (x; e)u(d) (33)
where x is the sin good, ' (x) is the utility from sin good consumption at the
young age, whereas e is the curative health spending.
Some individuals may well perceive the impact of the consumption of sin
good on their future health and longevity. But obviously not all agents are
farsighted. It is likely that some people do not perceive well (out of myopia or
ignorance) the impact of their lifestyle on their longevity. Positively they do not
anticipate correctly the e¤ect an health lifestyle and preventive measure taken
in the rst period on the length of the second.
Cremer et al (2012) proposes to study the design of the optimal public inter-
vention in an economy composed of agents who di¤er in terms of their farsight-
edness. They show that sin goods should be taxed, to an extent that depends
on individual myopia/ignorance. They also nd that prevention should be en-
couraged, but that curative expenditures should not necessarily be encouraged.
In particular, when individuals are myopic, it is not necessarily the case that
curative health spending should be subsidized. Two cases can occur. In the
rst case, individuals acknowledge and regret their past mistake once they are
in the second period of their life. In the second case, there is no regret. Cremer
et al (2012) show that, in the rst case, curative health care does not need to
be subsidized. However, individual savings should be subsidized in that case.
The underlying intuition is that individuals who realize their mistakes in the
second period, will then dedicate their savings between either consumption or
curative spending. On the contrary, if we focus now on the second case, where
individuals formulate no regret, and keep ignoring the impact of their behavior
on their longevity, the government needs to subsidize curative spending, in such
a way as to decentralize the rst-best optimum, unlike what prevails in the rst
case. Once heterogeneity concerns both rationality and earnings, the design of
the optimal public policy becomes even more di¢ cult. Restoring the rst-best
optimum then becomes a hard task.
Note that, among the two cases considered in Cremer et al (2012), the preva-
lence of regrets seems to be most widespread. For instance, recent surveys
showed that about 85 % of smokers aged 65 regret having started to smoke, in
the sense that, if they could change the past, they would behave di¤erently, and
would not have started to smoke (see Slovic 2001, Jarvis et al 2002, Fong et al
2004). Hence, when calibrating the optimal sin tax formula, it should be kept in
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mind that the proportion of individuals formulating regrets strongly dominates
the proportion of individuals ignoring mistakes. This pushes towards a larger
taxation of sin goods ceteris paribus.
5.3 Free-riding and longevity
Besides the prevention versus curation issue, the endogeneity of longevity raises
also other challenges. Actually, the analysis carried out in the previous section
considered individuals who may not be able to fully understand or internalize
the impact of their behavior on their own future longevity, because of some
myopia or ignorance. Whereas this constitutes an important issue, it should be
stressed that longevity-a¤ecting choices a¤ect not only individual well-being, but
tend also, through various channels, to inuence the well-being of the society
as a whole. Those other inuences may, here again, not be fully taken into
account by individuals when making longevity-a¤ecting choices, because either
of ignorance or of conscious free-riding.
To illustrate this, it is relevant to make a parallel with fertility decisions.
Fertility choices are made by parents, but those choices a¤ect the society as
a whole, through lots of externalities, which can be either positive - through
intergenerational transfers (Samuelson 1975) or scale e¤ects (Kremer 1994) -
or negative - through congestion or pollution. Adding some new living being
involves lots of e¤ects, which are usually not taken into account by parents. The
same problem arises regarding longevity-a¤ecting choices. Indeed, although
investing in ones health does not add a new person, it denitely adds some
life-years to the population, yielding positive or negative externalities.
This fact was rst highlighted by Davies and Kuhn (1992) and by Becker
and Philipson (1998). As shown by those authors, individuals do not necessarily
take into account, when making longevity-a¤ecting choices such as preventive
spending, the negative impact of those decisions on the return on savings in an
economy with annuities. Clearly, in an annuity market, the return on savings
depends negatively on the proportion of survivors to the old age. Hence, the
more individuals invest in their health, and the lower the return on annuities
will be. This inuence is obviously ignored by individuals, who may consider
that each of them brings only a minor inuence on the return. But as all
individuals buying annuities are in the same situation, the negative impact on
savings return may be non negligible.
To illustrate this, consider the following prevention choices under risk neu-
trality with respect to the duration of life. Individuals choose savings s and
prevention H so as to maximize their expected lifetime well-being:
u(c) +  (H)u(d) (34)
where c = w   s H. Under a perfect annuity market, yielding an actuarially
fair return, the gross return on savings is:
~R =
R
 (H)
(35)
25
which is decreasing in H. But in real life individuals ignore the impact of H on
~R, and take ~R as given. Hence, the rst-order condition for prevention is, at
the laissez-faire:
u0(c) = 0 (H)u(d) (36)
whereas, at the social optimum, the FOC for optimal prevention would be:
u0(c) = 0 (H) [u(d)  u0(d)d] (37)
Taking into account the negative impact of prevention on the return on saving
tends to reduce the marginal benet from prevention, leading to a lower optimal
prevention level in comparison with the laissez-faire.
Given that individuals tend to neglect the impact of preventive spending on
the return on savings, these tend to invest too much in their health in comparison
with what would maximize their expected lifetime well-being. As a consequence,
there is here an argument not for subsidizing, but for taxing prevention.11 Note
that this argument would be also valid in an economy without private annuities,
but with a PAYG pension scheme. Here again, individuals spending in their
health do not take into account its impact on the level of pension benets,
which invites for some taxation of prevention for the same reasons as the ones
mentioned above.
This argument remains also valid once some degree of risk aversion with
respect to the duration of life is introduced. Indeed, in that case, the FOCs for
optimal prevention is, at the laissez-faire,
0 (H)

u(c) + u(
Rs
 (H)
)

+ (H)0

u(c) + u

Rs
 (H)

[ u0 (c)]
= 0 (H)) [u(c)] + (1   (H))0 [u(c)]u0 (c) (38)
whereas the one for socially optimal prevention is:
0 (H)

u(c) + u(
Rs
 (H)
)

+ (H)0

u(c) + u

Rs
 (H)
"
 u0 (c)  u0

Rs
 (H)

Rs0 (H)
[ (H)]
2
#
= 0 (H)) [u(c)] + (1   (H))0 [u(c)]u0 (c) (39)
Thus the tendency to overinvest in prevention also holds in this case. However,
to the extent that risk aversion with respect to the duration of life pushes to-
wards more consumption early in life and reduces the amount of prevention, this
may potentially reduce the size of the extent of overinvestment in prevention.
11See Leroux et al (2011) on the study of the determinant of the optimal subsidy on health
in presence of the Davies-Kuhn or Becker-Philipson e¤ect.
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Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the Davies-Kuhn or Becker-Philipson
e¤ect is not the unique case in which individual longevity-a¤ecting decisions can
lead to overinvestment in prevention from a social perspective. Another well-
known case where overinvestment in prevention can arise consists of the sharing
of a common resource. This is the well-known Tragedy of the Commons. This
case is studied by Jouvet et al (2010) in the context of an overlapping genera-
tions (OLG) economy where individuals derive utility from their consumption
of material goods, as well as from the amount of space they benet from. The
underlying intuition is that there exists a limited amount of available space, and
that congestion is a major source of disutility.
Jouvet et al (2010) show that individuals, when deciding how much to spend
on their health, do a¤ect their life expectancy, and, hence, also raise the spatial
congestion at work in the economy. However, it is unlikely that individuals
take into account the impact of their decision on congestion. Hence, in order
to internalize that negative externality, a Pigouvian tax is required, designed in
such a way that it induces agents to invest the socially optimal amount in their
longevity, and not more.
5.4 Longevity, education and growth
Whereas there exist various engines of growth, a large emphasis was laid in
the recent decades on the crucial role played by education and human capi-
tal accumulation. More specically, and following the seminal contribution by
Ben Porath (1967), a strong attention was paid to the link between education,
life expectancy and growth. Using a 3-period OLG model with education and
fertility choices, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) showed that an improvement of sur-
vival conditions at the young age can, by reducing fertility, boost education and
growth. Boucekkine et al (2002) used a vintage human capital model to dis-
tinguish between three channels by which life expectancy a¤ects human capital
accumulation. First, a higher life expectancy raises the quantity of workers,
by reducing the number of workers dying prematurely; second, a higher life ex-
pectancy induces more investment in education (i.e. the Ben-Porath e¤ect). But
besides those two positive e¤ects, there is another, negative e¤ect: the rise in
life expectancy raises the average age of workers, which may reduce productivity
and growth.
More recently, various OLG models studied the existence of a feedback e¤ect:
not only does longevity a¤ect education and growth, but growth also allows for
more investment in health, leading to an improvement of survival conditions.
Hence there exists some virtuous cycle, where better survival conditions lead to
more education, and more education leads to better survival conditions. Mod-
els of that kind include, among others, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and
Chakraborty (2004), where the child decides how much education to attend, de
la Croix and Licandro (2013), where the education decision is taken by parents
alone, and Leker and Ponthiere (2015) where education is the outcome of an
intrafamily bargaining process between the parent and the child.
But the interplay between longevity, education and growth can also be stud-
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ied from a policy perspective. Besides the widely studied Ben Porath conjecture,
there are a lot of studies both cross-sectional and intertemporal showing that
education increases longevity. The latter e¤ect can be explained by the fact that
education implies better life-style, more emphasis on prevention, safer occupa-
tion. The crucial role played by education in this virtuous cycle suggests that
inequalities in the capacity of children to convert educational e¤ort into educa-
tional and professional achievements may be a key determinant of inequalities
not only in income, but, also, in health and longevity.
In a recent paper, Nishimura et al (2015) examine the design of the optimal
public policy in an OLG economy where education a¤ects life expectancy and
where life expectancy a¤ects education through the Ben Porath e¤ect. Those
authors tackle those two bidirectional e¤ects to obtain a general equilibrium
value for both variables, life expectancy and education level and to design policy
tools that can be used if the laissez faire solution departs from the rst best
optimality conditions.
They rst assume that individuals are rational and have a given longevity,
and that individuals must borrow to fund their education, which will improve
their future wage with some possible decay. They show that the Ben Porath
e¤ect holds only is retirement is exible and if human capital does not decay
too much over the lifecycle. Turning to the case longevity increases with edu-
cation, they determine the equilibrium value of both education and longevity.
Education is shown to be higher than in the canonical Ben Porath e¤ect for two
reasons. First it increases the length of life and if one more year of life is worth
being lived education increases lifetime utility. Second, an additional length of
life makes postponing retirement more attractive. They study the relation be-
tween longevity and education using a two period overlapping generation model.
They also consider the case of two types of agents who di¤er in their capacity
to transform education into human capital.
Among the reasons for government intervention there is the possibility that
physical or human capital accumulation be suboptimal. Another reason is that
if agents are myopic, they can choose too little education and this call for a
Pigovian subsidy. There is also the objective of redistributing income across
individuals having di¤erent learning capacities. With an utilitarian objective
and asymmetric information one ends up taxing the level of education of the
individuals with the lower learning capacity. This implies, quite paradoxically,
a widening of the longevity gap.
Finally, note that those studies, which take place in dynamic OLG models,
usually assume, for the sake of simplicity, risk neutrality with respect to the
duration of life. The reason is that relaxing that assumption would make it
di¢ cult to derive a closed-form solution for the education investment, making
the resolution of the dynamic system di¢ cult if not impossible. However, intro-
ducing some risk-aversion with respect to the duration of life could, as stated
above, a¤ect the form of the relation between education and longevity.
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5.5 Longevity, pensions and growth
Besides the link between education, longevity and growth, a strong attention was
also paid to the impact of longevity on capital accumulation and pensions. Actu-
ally, demographic aging poses a major challenge to all industrialized economies
and a large number of developing countries. Although an increase in the av-
erage age is a common trend around the world, the factors that lead to such
changes vary across countries ; they can be traced back to decreases in fertility
rates and increases in longevity, albeit at di¤erent magnitudes of importance
in di¤erent economies. There exist a number of studies, which investigate how
institutional factors and behavioral responses may a¤ect the impact of aging on
capital accumulation.
An interesting discussion on the e¤ect of longevity increase on growth is
provided by Bloom et al (2007). The authors point out that, in theory, im-
provements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the average
age of retirement, with little e¤ect on savings rates. In many countries, however,
retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from
keeping pace with changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for
life-cycle savings. They empirically show that increased longevity raises aggre-
gate savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement
incentives. Similarly, Bloom et. al. (2003) show that aging leads to more capital
accumulation even if retirement is endogenous. Echevarria (2004) reaches the
same conclusion. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) show that the positive e¤ect of
mortality decline on capital accumulation is made larger if education decisions
are endogenous. De la Croix and Licandro (1999) and Zhang et al. (2001, 2003)
argue that the e¤ect of increasing longevity depends on its initial level. For low
levels of life expectancy the e¤ect is positive but it can turn negative for high
levels. Similarly, Miyazawa (2006) also shows that the e¤ect of an increase in
longevity on economic growth has a hump-shaped pattern.
Increase longevity can impact growth indirectly through the pay-as-you go
social security system, whose return depends on both fertility and mortality.
Among the studies that link the impact of aging with social security systems,
Ito and Tabata (2008) nd that the unfunded social security system provides a
su¢ cient mechanism to have such a hump shaped relationship between longevity
and per capita output. Pestieau et al (2008) study the design of the optimal
preventive health spending in a second-best context where the replacement rate
of the PAYG system is taken as given, and show that the optimal health subsidy
is decreasing with the prevailing replacement rate. Tabata (2014) looks at the
e¤ect of a shift from a DB to a DC PAYG pension on growth. He shows
that this shift is growth enhancing and alleviates the cost of aging. Heijdra and
Mierau (2011) also compare the relative e¤ects of DB and DC PAYG pensions on
economic growth with aging. They show that the DC formula fares better that
the DB one in facilitating growth. They also show that raising the retirement
age as a response to an increase in longevity dampens the growth gains. In
the same vein, Dedry et al. (2015) provides a comparison of several di¤erent
institutional settings, i.e. di¤erent social security systems and retirement age
29
policies, and types of aging in a unied framework. Their main conclusion is
that from the long run welfare viewpoint, the ideal is a dened contribution
scheme and a mandatory early retirement constraint.
5.6 Longevity, wealth and bequests
Over the last decades we have witnessed two striking trends, the steady increase
of longevity and the growing role of inheritance in capital accumulation. It is
di¢ cult not to think that there are some relations between these two evolu-
tions. Miyazawa (2006) observes that the e¤ect of an increase in longevity on
capital accumulation is ambiguous. First, higher longevity increases the aggre-
gate saving rate directly by increasing precautionary saving for the prolonged
retirement and indirectly by increasing the accidental bequests (bequest-wage
ratio is important because the higher income group has a higher propensity to
save). Second, it reduces the frequency of accidental bequests, which implies
that the population share of the higher income group decreases. This leads to a
reduction in aggregate savings. The relative shares of these factors change over
the aging horizon. This is also true for the income inequality (rst positive,
then negative). Kinugasa and Mason (2006) provide empirical support to shows
that an increase of wealth across countries is likely with mortality decline.
Theoretically, on the basis of some stylized facts we have reasons to believe
that longevity increase fosters bequests. Those facts are the following: (i) Mor-
tality rates decrease but the uncertainty does not decrease. More concretely,
the process of rectangularisation of the survival curves seems to have stopped,
if not reversed. (ii) The shift from dened benets into dened contribution in
both public and pension schemes reduces the annuitization of retirement sav-
ing. (iii) Increased longevity implies a higher demand for long term care, which
are rarely insured because of the thinness of the market and the lack of social
insurance. (iv) The precautionary saving induced by these three facts seems
to increase more than proportionally with income. Putting together the above
evidence implies that we should observe an increase in accidental bequests and
in the inequality of inherited wealth.
Note that the size of the rise in inequality in inherited wealth is not invariant
to the postulated preferences, and, in particular, to the attitude of individuals
towards risk with respect to the duration of their life. To see this, remind the
above discussions on life horizon e¤ects in the choice of savings (Section 3.2). If
an individual exhibits a high degree of risk aversion with respect to the duration
of life, he will save less than a risk-neutral agent. As a consequence, the two
individuals will, in case of premature death, leave accidental bequests of quite
di¤erent sizes. Hence, it appears that another determinant of the extent of
inequality in inherited wealth consists of the heterogeneity of parental tastes in
terms of attitude towards risk of premature death. Highly risk averse individuals
save less and leave also lower accidental bequests, unlike risk-neutral individuals.
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6 Final remarks
Our survey illustrates the deep challenges raised by varying longevity for policy-
makers. The Welfare State, which was built at a time of worse survival con-
ditions, cannot be left unchanged at a time of deep demographic changes. As
Lee (2003) rightly emphasized, ageing can be a major opportunity for human
societies, provided these can adapt their institutions and policies. On the con-
trary, ageing can become problematic in a society with xed and inadequate
institutions.
Having stressed this general point, our analyses suggest that "adapting" the
Welfare State to the rise in longevity is not a simple task. As we emphasized,
a major di¢ culty lies in the existence of signicant and persistent inequalities
between humans in terms of longevity. Given those inequalities, it is probably
not fair to focus only on average statistics when thinking about "adapting"
the Welfare State. But taking those inequalities into account is not simple,
and an appropriate evolution of the Welfare State can only be done provided
a strong attention is paid to the normative foundations for public intervention.
From that perspective, the tensions between ex ante and ex post egalitarianism
illustrate quite well the incompatible policy corollaries of conicting normative
principles.
Besides inequalities, another major source of di¢ culties lies in human het-
erogeneity in terms of preferences and rationality. In our survey, we paid a
large attention to the attitude of individuals towards risk with respect to the
duration of their life. But the heterogeneity of preferences concerns many other
dimensions (e.g. taste for sin goods, (des)utility of physical activity, etc.) and
the design of optimal policies in the context of heterogeneous preferences in
dimensions a¤ecting longevity is particularly complex.12
All in all, it appears that the adaptation of the Welfare State to the chal-
lenges raised by varying longevity is an ambitious task, which is likely to remain
at the policy agenda for some time. We have learnt from dynamic models where
both economic and demographic outcomes are jointly determined that the con-
tinuation of the observed demographic trends in the future may not be indepen-
dent from the evolution of the Welfare State in the next decades. Hence, given
that both economic and demographic variables are jointly determined, thoughts
about how to adjust the Welfare State must necessarily take into account how
those adjustments will impact the demography, et vice versa. Undoubtedly,
taking those bidirectional relations or "loops" into account makes the exercise
more di¢ cult, and also more necessary.
12On this problem, see Fleurbaey and Ponthiere (2013), who proposed di¤erent social welfare
functions for the design of optimal prevention policies in an economy where individuals di¤er
in their disutility of preventive e¤orts.
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